It is argued that the US government has decidedly moved towards encouraging cooperation in R&D across all sectors of the economy since the early 1980s. The Republican Administration in the early 1980s set the stage for a radical shift in market environment affecting business strategy and behavior, including the undertaking of cooperative R&D, by introducing extensive changes in antitrust and intellectual property rights law and enforcement. These changes weakened competition policy and significantly strengthened IPR protection. Moreover, a series of legislative actions created the legal framework for promoting industry-university-government cooperation in science and technology and for allowing industry and universities to benefit financially from the results of research funded by the federal government The Democratic Administrations in the 1990s further built on this system, largely by pushing forward a series of Programs actively promoting government-industry-university partnerships and trying to "channel" private sector R&D activity in technological areas with potentially widespread economic returns. While many of the specific S&T programs have since been scaled down by Congress, the general policy orientation towards closer collaboration between industry, universities, and government has remained intact.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section provides an introduction to the technology policy of the United States that provides the appropriate background for our subject. The second section introduces the policies affecting R&D collaboration put in place during the past couple of decades. The third and fourth sections examine more closely the two most important policies, namely antitrust and IPR policy respectively, that have been changed to accommodate collaboration. Finally, the fifth section summarizes and concludes.
Technical Abstract
The US government has decidedly moved towards encouraging cooperation in research and development (R&D) between firms, universities, and other research institutes since the early 1980s. The Republican Administration in the early 1980s set the stage for a radical shift in market environment affecting business strategy and behavior, including the undertaking of cooperative R&D, by introducing extensive changes in antitrust and intellectual property rights law and enforcement. These changes weakened competition policy and significantly strengthened IPR protection. Moreover, a series of legislative actions created the legal framework for promoting industry-university-government cooperation in science and technology and for allowing industry and universities to benefit financially from the results of research funded by the federal government The Democratic Administrations in the 1990s further built on this system, largely by pushing forward a series of Programs actively promoting government-industry-university partnerships and trying to "channel" private sector R&D activity in technological areas with potentially widespread economic returns. While many of the specific S&T programs have since been scaled down by Congress, the general policy orientation towards closer collaboration between industry, universities, and government has remained intact.
AN INTRODUCTION TO US TECHNOLOGY POLICY*
For much of the postwar period, the economic policy of the United States (US) had, more or less, been synonymous to macroeconomic policy. The federal government had largely shied away from industrial policy and civilian technology policy. 1 Various Presidents since Herbert Hoover in the late 1920s had expressed interest in technological advancement for economic growth and in the difficulties of industry segments -primarily small manufacturers -in producing and/or accessing new technologies. However, it was President William Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore that first issued an official document outlining an aggressive approach to technology policy for the federal government focusing directly on economic growth. Released only a few months after their arrival to the White House, this document proclaimed a radical departure from the postwar policies of the US, as is evident early on the first page:
"American technology policy must move in a new direction to build economic strength and spur economic growth. The traditional federal role in technology development has been limited to support of basic science and mission-oriented research in the Defense Department, NASA, and other agencies. This strategy was appropriate for a previous generation but not for today's profound challenges. We cannot rely on the serendipitous application of defense technology to the private sector. We must aim directly at these new challenges and focus our efforts on the new opportunities before us, recognizing that government can play a key role in helping private firms develop and profit from innovations." (White House, 1993a, p.1).
The "old" orientation of US science and technology policy had stood on two pillars.
First, a very active basic science policy, based on the consensus built around the suggestions of Vannevar Bush's report to the US President at the closing of World War II (Bush, 1945) . Second, the development of advanced technology by several federal *The STEP TO RJVs project was co-ordinated by Yannis Caloghirou, National Technical University of Athens/Laboratory of Industrial and Energy Economics. Project participants are: NTUA/LIEE (Greece), SIRN (UK), FEEM (Italy), IDATE (France), Stockholm School of Economics (Sweden), Universidad III de Madrid (Spain), PREST (U.K.). 1 With exceptions, of course, particularly at times of widely perceived national emergencies like the response to the oil price increases in the 1970s. In addition, one must consider the policies at the state level which have often been much more microeconomic in nature and much more explicitly concerned with issues related to industry, investment, and technology (Rycroft, 1990) .
agencies in pursuit of their statutory missions (Ergas, 1987) . The most important of these missions has been national defense spearheaded by large R&D expenditures by the Department of Defense -until recently accounting for more than the expenses of all other government agencies combined -and extensive military procurement.
According to Branscomb (1993) , since World War II, US policy had been based on the following principles:
1. Basic science is a public good. Investments in science lead to new technologies and, occasionally, new industries; however, the market fails to support basic research to the socially optimal level. Recognizing the importance of basic science the government entered into a "social contract" with scientists, accepting to support scientific research at a much grander scale than ever before while permitting the direction and quality of this research to be determined on the basis of scientific meritocracy (peer review).
2. Federal agencies must aggressively pursue the development of new technology for specific "missions" in activities with extensive public good characteristics, including national defense, nuclear energy, space exploration, and public health.
3. The federal government must refrain from "picking winners" through R&D investments directed to technologies for commercial exploitation and specific firms.
It is the private sector's responsibility to try to benefit from government-supported science (and education) and from mission technology spin-offs.
4. A further role of the federal government is to create the appropriate regulatory environment to enable efficient markets and to occasionally steer private sector investment in desired directions (e.g., toward environmentally benign technologies).
Science and technology can be used to support the struggle against communism.
This was essentially a supply-side approach. The mechanism through which government investments in R&D would assist industrial innovation was that of a "linear" ("pipeline") model according to which scientific discoveries (and mission technology spin-offs) inevitably lead to new commercial technologies. The selection of technologies for development and the timing of commercial innovation is left entirely to market forces.
In contrast, the "new" policy orientation of the early 1990s has had the following objectives:
• "Strengthening America's industrial competitiveness and creating jobs;
• Creating a business environment where technical innovation can flourish and where investment is attracted to new ideas; • Ensuring the coordinated management of technology all across the government;
• Forging a closer working partnership among industry, federal and state governments, workers, and universities; • Redirecting the focus of national efforts toward technologies crucial to today's businesses and a growing economy, such as information and communication, flexible manufacturing, and environmental technologies; and, • Reaffirming our commitment to basic science, the foundation on which all technical progress is ultimately built." (White House, 1993a, p.1).
Several of these objectives pointed at a radical shift in the traditional policies of the US federal government. Particularly striking were objectives one, three, and five calling for an aggressive federal technology policy to improve the international economic competitiveness of the country, to coordinate management across agencies, and to aim for technologies explicitly for economic growth (Vonortas, 1995) . Objectives two and four also called for an enhanced government role in creating the necessary infrastructure and social capital to attract and efficiently utilize private investment in areas of technology of strategic economic importance. Objective six simply continued earlier policies. With the possible exception of the third, all above objectives remain on the agenda of the Administration.
The basic principles of the new US S&T policy orientation in the 1990s have been succinctly characterized by Branscomb (1993) to be the following:
1. The government must partly shift its priorities from large government missions toward assisting the technological prowess and international competitiveness of the private sector. National defense cannot anymore be driving technologies in many cutting-edge fields. Government agencies are encouraged to buy off-the-shelf, stateof-the-art technologies from the private sector. Agencies with significant S&T budgets should try to develop, to the extent possible, dual-use technologies.
2. The government must try to balance the supply and demand sides of its technology policy. That is, in addition to the creation of new technologies, significant weight must be placed on technology dissemination. The government must pay attention to the ability of firms to locate, access, adapt, and use new technologies.
3. State governments must increase their role in the national technology policy. At a minimum, they must be prepared to assist smaller firms, attract capital, and diffusing innovation-related knowledge (e.g., manufacturing extension services).
4. An increased dialogue with industry is necessary to assist the government in making decisions with respect to civilian technologies. Specific technology policy goals can be frequently pursued through public/private cooperative R&D undertakings.
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. A more relaxed antitrust environment allows firms to enter multiple strategic alliances to allay the pressures from increased international competition and to assist them in responding to the demands of rapidly changing technologies. Multi-firm research joint ventures for precompetitive and infrastructural R&D must be favored.
6. An increasingly stringent enforcement of intellectual property rights by the court system promotes the creation and rapid commercialization of new technological knowledge for the competitiveness of American industry. Intellectual property matters can be linked with the efforts of the US Trade Representative office to ensure a "level playing field" for American companies in foreign markets.
7. The system of national laboratories should increase their interaction with the private sector in order to expedite the transfer of innovation-related knowledge and facilitate large-scale, heavy facility-dependent R&D.
8. The research universities must also interact more with the private sector. This will both create an alternative source of funds for the universities and will speed up the commercialization of good science to benefit industry. Manufacturing R&D was promoted through collaborative agreements in the private sector, made possible by an increasingly relaxed antitrust regulatory system.
AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICIES FOR RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES
The first Clinton Administration arrived with a grand vision that turned technology policy into a front-runner (White House, 1993b) . Although it set out to implement a serious policy shift, however, neither the justifications of this shift nor the specific instruments to achieving the main policy objectives were entirely new. The "new" policy orientation reflected issues and solutions debated for years in the United States.
President Jimmy
Carter's science advisor had considered several similar ideas in the late 1970s. The science advisor to President George Bush (Clinton's predecessor) was also more sympathetic to an active government role in civilian technology policy.
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One such recommendation was that a more balanced supply-side/demand-side technology policy is much more appropriate today for the US today than, say, twenty years ago. The obvious justification relates to the change in society's perception of high technology (Branscomb and Florida, 1998) . The traditional perception of high tech -still reflected in our indicators -has been research-intensive manufacturing industries, like computers and aircraft. The penetration of technologies like information technology, biotechnology, and advanced materials throughout the economy has, however, changed the basic meaning of high tech. Rather than referring to the output of R&D-intensive industries, high tech now refers to a style of work applicable to just about every business.
We can have high tech steel production and low tech steel production; high tech machine tools and low tech machine tools; high tech banking services and low tech banking services; high tech entertainment services and low tech entertainment services; and so forth.
This change is said to have revolutionized the features of a successful technology policy.
Distributed knowledge, skill, entrepreneurship, together with new forms of collaboration between firms, universities and the government, can now result in more effective products and services. Importantly for both firm and worker income, they can result in significantly differentiated products and services. In other words, technology policy must be more user-centered and demand-based than ever before.
The S&T policy community in the US had observed such changes since the late 1970s, slowly but steadily moving towards a position of extensive S&T policy modifications.
The arguments often drew strength from the signs of declining American competitiveness in vital industries such as consumer electronics, cars, machine tools, and computers from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. The signs were strong enough to even move the Reagan Administration, in principle hostile to anything that can be labeled microeconomic
Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology (FCCSET) was revived and given authority to identify program areas of interest across all major S&T agencies. However, the effort to back up the identified "critical technologies" of high performance computing and communication, management. At least two major steps were taken during its time. One was the discontinuation of the long-term policies of the United States related to competition and intellectual property rights. Another was the initiation of an extensive public debate on economic competitiveness, exemplified by the setup of the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness and its report in the mid-1980s (PCIC, 1985) .
The activities around the first step culminated in two concrete actions. First, there was a radical change in the philosophy of antitrust (competition) Court in the District of Columbia, the first Court dedicated to the adjudication of issues related to intellectual property, also in 1982. Essentially, the long-term US policy was being reversed from strict enforcement of antimonopoly regulations (based on a "per se" approach) and fairly lax enforcement of intellectual property rights laws to more relaxed enforcement of antimonopoly regulations (based on a "rule of reason" approach) and much stricter enforcement of intellectual property rights laws (Vonortas, 1997a) .
These actions were in line with the Administration's philosophy that, besides the big "missions" like national defense, the role of the government is limited to the general economic and regulatory environment in which businesses operate. Three successive Republican Administrations in the 1980s became increasingly convinced that the world had changed for American business and that this necessitated policy changes. They were willing to take the initiative to help strengthen what the S&T policy community was claiming to be the foundation of the competitiveness of American business: its ability to create and deploy technological innovations. Often nudged by the Democratic Partydominated Congress, these Administrations were willing to push for the aforementioned changes in antitrust and intellectual property rights policies, introduce a R&E tax credit, maintain the government's support of basic research, and go along with supporting R&D in small businesses through the SBIR program (requiring all agencies with R&D budget biotechnology, advanced materials, and advanced manufacturing with real budgets did not get very far. An OSTP document of the time entitled "US Technology Policy" did not have much success either. 4 Subsequent versions of these guidelines have followed in the same direction. See next Section.
to allocate part of it to small businesses). They were, however, much less willing to offer direct assistance to civilian technology development that many S&T experts had hoped.
The (Mason, 1946) . To the extent they did, they were raising unwanted barriers for others and were thus undesirable. Guidelines introduced significant changes in the interpretation of the law and they were used by the Reagan Administration to develop new concepts and policies. These changes reflected a build-up of "anti-structural" views since the 1970s that rendered doubtful the mainstream consensus stressing that market structure is a significant indicator of the degree of market power. The anti-structural views, instead, were based on beliefs that any type of market structure allows significant variability in firm behavior and that the entry potential in a market is more important as a predictor of firm behavior than internal market conditions, even when there is high market dominance (Mueller, 1993) .
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines were revised once more in 1992 without, however, reversing the course set during the 1980s. According to this set of Guidelines, "market share and market concentration data provide only the starting point in analyzing the competitive effects of mergers." (quoted by Ordover and Willig, 1993, p. 144) . Instead of being automatically challenged, a merger lying outside the "concentration safe region" would be placed under scrutiny to determine whether anticompetitive effects are likely involving a comprehensive examination of the specific market circumstances. 
Extension: The National Cooperative Research and Production Act
NCRA's limited reach to pre-competitive research was subsequently challenged in favor of widespread modifications to its provisions in order to include downstream activities such as product development, prototyping and production (e.g., US Senate, 1991).
Criticism of the NCRA essentially came from two sides, both claiming to perceive some kind of a problem for American firms in commercializing innovations and keeping up with frequent product/process improvements. The driving argument of the first groupthe "traditionalists" -was that firm incentives to collaborate in pre-competitive research (which the NCRA tried to promote) were being hampered by subsequent restrictions concerning the collective exploitation of the results of this research. Theoretical analysis showed, for example, that the anticipation of head-on competition in development and production between potential co-venturers lowers their ex ante incentive to cooperate in research because they expect the surplus to flow to consumers (Katz and Ordover, 1990) .
It was thus argued that "...to the extent that unbridled downstream competition dissipates rents from successful R&D efforts, it may be necessary to allow RJV participants some restraints on ex post competition." (Ordover and Baumol, 1988, p.30) . Such restraints could boost incentives for more research upstream and speed the transfer of innovations to the market.
While traditionalist claims may indeed be true, the analysis they have depended on is far within firms, and sometimes between firms and other organizations like universities." (Jorde and Teece, 1990, p.77) . Under those circumstances, vertical as well as horizontal linkages assume important roles in leveraging the in-house technical capabilities of a firm.
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The opposition to broadening the coverage of NCRA basically concentrated on fears that antitrust policy was becoming too relaxed, thus, endangering further loss of the country's international competitiveness by allowing extensive restrictions to competition. It was argued that existing merger guidelines were already very lenient for joint activities involving firms with considerable combined market share (Harris and Mowery, 1990 ).
There were also fears that increasing cooperation and concentration of market power would adversely affect smaller firms. 9 The proposed extensions were said to increase the chances for collusion while ignoring the real weakness of American firms which is their slow adoption of new technologies developed internally or externally (Rosenberg and Steinmueller, 1988) .
Ultimately, favor went with the proponents of change; the challenge was sustained.
Amendments to the NCRA were turned into public law known as the National Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA) in 1993. The prerequisites for collaboration in production were determined to be that, first, the joint venture participants had also cooperated earlier in R&D and, second, they would not exclude independent activities in the same field.
Seven hundred and forty six RJVs, with several thousands of business participants have registered under the provisions of the NCRA and the NCRPA during the first 14 years (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . The response to the legislation is considered low, given the fact that interfirm strategic technical alliances have exploded at the same time. What's more, an increasing rate of registrations until 1995 has turned into a rapidly decreasing rate during the past three years. 10 Recent studies have shown that the registered RJVs have tended to focus on high technology areas, led by information technology and followed by new materials technologies and, in some distance, biotechnology (Vonortas, 1997a (Vonortas, , 1997b .
9 See, for example, the testimony of Michael Porter (US Senate, 1991). 10 The decrease in registration may be partly related to the aforementioned "Antritrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors". While a draft of this document was released only in October 1999, the tolerance of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission for inter-firm collaboration has become increasingly evident during the past few years. It should be mentioned that this new (draft) Guidelines also define "safety zones" guaranteeing the absence of government interference. The Agencies declare to abstain from challenging any kind of collaboration among competitors when the market shares of the collaboration and its participants collectively account for up to 20% of each relevant market in which competition may be affected. Specifically for RJVs, the Agencies declare to abstain from challenging "a competitor collaboration on the basis of effects on competition in an innovation market where three or more independently controlled research efforts in addition to those of the collaboration possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in R&D that is a close substitute for the R&D activity of the collaboration."
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
The United States intellectual property protection system is arguably one of the oldest and the most well developed in the world (Wallerstein et al. 1993) . This system has been greatly reinforced since the early 1980s, starting with the creation of the 11 In the vast majority of intellectual property cases, restraints are evaluated under the rule of reason. This involves an inquiry into whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects. Application of the rule of reason generally requires a comprehensive inquiry into market conditions.
No such inquiry is initiated for intellectual property arrangement restraints that affect product, technology, and innovation markets falling within the antitrust "safety zones"
defined by the Guidelines. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the antitrust authorities will abstain from challenging a restraint if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and the licensees collectively account for no more than 20% of the relevant goods market significantly affected by the restraint. Also, absent extraordinary circumstances, the authorities will abstain from challenging a restraint that may affect competition in a technology market if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) there are four or more independently controlled technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties in the IP arrangement that may be substitutable for the exchanged technology at a comparable cost to the user. Finally, absent extraordinary circumstances, the authorities will abstain from challenging a restraint that may affect competition in an innovation market if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) four or more independently controlled entities in addition to the parties in the IP arrangement possess the required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in R&D that is a close substitute of the R&D activities of the parties in the IP agreement.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A dramatic change has occurred in the way policy analysts and decision-makers in capitalist economies perceive the advantages and disadvantages of inter-firm cooperation.
Rather than organizational mechanisms to assist declining industries and weakened firms, inter-firm cooperative agreements are now viewed as veritable competitive mechanisms, right at the strategy core of most companies in high technology industries. A voluminous economic and business literature has shown that large numbers of firms regularly use strategic technical alliances to access, create, and diffuse technological knowledge.
Research joint ventures -being just one kind of strategic technical alliances -now feature prominently on the policy agenda of every developed country government.
The US government has decidedly followed this trend since the early 1980s. While there have been serious disagreements between the two major political parties during this time period concerning the appropriate role of the government in providing incentives to the private sector to cooperate in R&D, few in either camp seem to doubt the value of RJVs.
Abiding with the doctrine on non-market interference, the Republican Administrations of Administration did not survive intact. Some were eliminated (e.g., TRP), others were weakened or neutralized (e.g., ATP), and still others lost their direction under a weakened Administration and became ineffective, even non-operational (e.g., PNGV). The blow was severe and, together with the continuing conservatism of the legislature concerning the appropriate role of the government in science and technology (US Congress, 1998), it seems to have curtailed the enthusiasm of the Administration for active technology-cuminnovation policy.
Even so, the general policy orientation towards legislative leniency regarding inter-firm collaboration and a strong partnership between industry, universities, and government has remained intact. Government policy has largely adapted to and, even more, has acquired a clear supporting attitude towards the continuing drive of the private sector to engage in complex webs of strategic technology alliances.
